

**İslam mirasında miras ve bilişsel sistemler, bir model olarak Yahya
Muhammed**
**Heritage and cognitive systems in Islamic heritage, Yahya Muhammad as a
model**

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Abstract:

The contemporary Arab intellectual scene has witnessed many elite intellectual projects that attempted to study issues related to Islamic culture and heritage. Yahya Muhammad is among the thinkers who sought to present a reading of Islamic heritage. His book, *Critique of the Arab Mind in a Balance*, is a philosophical critique in which he attempts to reveal the pitfalls, methodological and intellectual errors, and the reading presented by Muhammad Abed al-Jabri in the formation of the Arab mind. In this book, he also criticizes the external reading of heritage and blames Arab and Islamic elites for adopting this reading. According to him, the cognitive systems for reading Islamic heritage embrace two systems: the existential system and the normative system. The existential system concerns the two circles: philosophical and mystical, while the normative system concerns the rational and rhetorical (transmitted) circle.

Keywords: heritage, Islamic mind, existential system, normative system, external reading, traditional reading.

Introduction:

The contemporary Arab intellectual scene has witnessed many elite intellectual projects that have had a significant influence on the intellectual arena. These thinkers focused on presenting contemporary readings of heritage and Islamic philosophy in particular. The Iraqi thinker Yahya Muhammad is among those who had an impact due to the readings he attempted to present in his various works—*The Science of the Path*, *Systems of Heritage*, and *Critique of the Arab Mind in a Balance*.

Yahya Muhammad considers that Islamic heritage embraces two cognitive systems: the existential system and the normative system. The existential system deals with the philosophical and mystical circles, while the normative system concerns the rational and rhetorical (transmitted) circle, encompassing the sciences of theology, jurisprudence, exegesis, and Hadith. These two systems constitute the standard for understanding Islamic heritage, as they encompass knowledge produced in Arab culture and determine the reading of heritage issues.

Accordingly, Yahya Muhammad posed a methodological question, considered a new opening in Arab and Islamic culture: How do we read heritage?

1. Concept of Heritage:

Heritage derives from the root (*waratha*), meaning: "A man bequeathed property to his child as a good inheritance; his father bequeathed him something; they inherited him from so-and-so; he bequeathed it as inheritance, that is, he placed it into his property for his heirs; and they inherited it from generation to generation; and he bequeathed the covenant to his heir, meaning he left it to him." Heritage, according to Al-Zamakhshari, refers to the combination of lawful and unlawful, meaning they combined their own share of inheritance with that of others. He continues, stating that inheritance here refers to the wealth left by the deceased.

Based on this, the term heritage in our Arabic dictionaries originates from the root *waratha*, synonymous with inheritance, bequest, and legacy. It refers to what a deceased person leaves for the living, whether in wealth or rank. The term appears in the Qur'an in several forms, for example: "And you consume inheritance in a devouring way" (Al-Fajr, 19). Its meaning is the combination of lawful and unlawful; heritage here refers to the wealth left behind by the deceased. In classical Arab and Muslim philosophical discourse, the term was absent, and its foreign-language equivalents did not carry the same meaning it holds today in contemporary Arab discourse. Al-Jabri defines heritage as "the cultural, intellectual, religious, literary, and artistic legacy."

The Qur'an also says: "He will inherit me and inherit from the family of Jacob, and make him, my Lord, pleasing" (Maryam, 6); and "Then We caused the Book to be inherited by those We chose among Our servants; among them was one who wronged himself, and among them was one moderate, and among them was one who excelled with good deeds by Allah's permission; that is the great favor" (Fatir, 32); and in another verse: "And Solomon inherited David" (An-Naml, 16).

It can be said that all classical Arabic dictionaries define heritage as inheritance left by a father to his son, whether material or immaterial. For instance, in *Lisan al-Arab* by Ibn Manzur, "The heir is an attribute of God, the everlasting who inherits creation and remains after their perishing; God inherits the earth and all upon it, and He is the best of inheritors; it is said, so-and-so inherited wealth of so-and-so upon his death."

Terminologically, Hassan Hanafi defines heritage as "a set of fixed innate beliefs and enduring truths that do not change; it is a collection of realizations of these theories at a certain time, in a specific historical situation, and for a specific group, forming their worldview." According to Mohamed Amara, to present heritage to current and future generations as a glory of reason, we must seek the remnants left by time and events from the intellectual schools of Arab-Islamic thought that valued reason and produced fruits of reflection on phenomena and texts.

Hassan Hanafi also states that "heritage is all that has reached us from the past within prevailing civilization, linking heritage to reality; each generation interprets its knowledge according to its context, resulting in multiple interpretations." Today, heritage for us is all that is common among Arabs—the intellectual and spiritual legacies shared collectively. In the twentieth century, the term "heritage" referred to what Arabs inherited from their ancestors of civilization.

According to Mohamed Arkoun, heritage in the broad sense is divine, and humans cannot alter it; it represents absolute eternal truth. For twenty years, this heritage tried to establish itself within a hostile social and cultural arena, then became Islamic heritage. Hassan Hanafi summarizes: "Heritage is a set of interpretations provided by each generation based on its specific requirements, and the original sources of heritage allow this multiplicity since reality is the foundation on which it was built."

2. The Issue of Heritage in Arab Thought:

First: Heritage in Al-Jabri's Thought:

For Al-Jabri, heritage finds "its referential framework within contemporary Arab thought and its specific concepts, not outside of it." Heritage represents the cognitive and ideological foundation, as well as the emotional core of Arab-Islamic culture. In the modern Arab revival discourse, heritage was mobilized in two ways: to adhere to roots as a mechanism of revival and as a reaction to external Western threats, serving the affirmation of self-identity.

Al-Jabri distinguishes two forms of heritage understanding: the traditional, held by those with a conventional approach to heritage, lacking critical spirit and historical perspective, and the contemporary Orientalist perception of Arab-Islamic heritage in today's intellectual scene. Both Western-influenced and Marxist approaches, which imposed external frameworks, fail to capture the essence of the heritage.

To overcome these readings, Al-Jabri proposed an alternative methodology, which he considers capable of producing a contemporary reading of heritage. Methodologically, it addresses two main problems: objectivity (using structural treatment, historical analysis, and ideological proposition) and continuity (heritage is ours; it cannot be distanced from us). The contemporary Arab discourse leans toward ideological concerns (revival), but according to Al-Jabri, it suffers from methodological and vision gaps, necessitating a critique of the Arab mind to address the stagnation of the renaissance.

Al-Jabri's intellectual project critiques the foundations of the Arab mind, surpassing reformist thought to establish a critical awareness based on democracy, liberalism, and modernity, aiming to produce a mature, scientific reading of heritage while utilizing Western methodologies. He advocates a serious, critical reading of heritage to identify shortcomings and overcome them, drawing on heritage aspects recognized for their scholarly and practical effectiveness.

Second: Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd – Historical Reading:

Abu Zayd rejects the inherited static view and calls for reformulating Arab thought by destabilizing entrenched knowledge structures. He emphasizes reshaping religious heritage, particularly using Western scientific methods, including secularism, to remove sacrality from heritage and separate human intellectual heritage from the Quran. He distinguishes religious texts from religion itself and bases his system on the critique of traditional texts (exegesis, ijtihad, and deduction), which suppressed reason and scientific awareness, confining Arab culture to the interpretation and explanation of texts.

Third: Heritage According to Yahya Muhammad:

Yahya Muhammad identifies two readings of heritage: external and internal. He criticizes Arab and Islamic elites for adopting the external reading, which fails to reveal the continuity and

unity of heritage despite differing external factors. He uses the project of Moroccan thinker Muhammad Abed al-Jabri, particularly *Critique of the Arab Mind*, as a model to critique this reading. Yahya Muhammad provides a critical, epistemological reading of the pitfalls in al-Jabri's formation of the Arab mind. While he critiques al-Jabri's external reading, he also praises his attempt to address the intellectual system traversed by Arab-Islamic thought.

Fourth: Critique of the External Reading of Heritage:

Yahya Muhammad poses a methodological question: How do we read heritage? He emphasizes methodological thinking, rejecting unstructured readings that consider details without connecting them to general principles. Methodological reading conflicts with two main approaches: internal analysis, following the internal logic of heritage knowledge (endorsed by Yahya Muhammad), and external analysis, tracing external factors (geographical, social, political) influencing heritage development. He argues that internal reading reaches the core of the cognitive phenomenon, understanding the internal logic of heritage, unlike the external reading that attributes its emergence entirely to environmental factors.

Consequently, he believed that the **internal reading penetrates the core of the cognitive phenomenon, not outside it**, as it assumes the phenomenon as a logical framework enjoying a reasonable degree of axiomatic geometric order according to what is imposed by the specific logic of the knowledge-generating principles, which he called the "dynamo of thought." This reading does not investigate the environmental and historical factors behind the emergence of the cognitive phenomenon as a tool and vision, unlike the **external reading**, which fully attributes its emergence to the surrounding culture, either automatically or as a conditioned reflex. **Thus, the internal reading penetrates the core of the cognitive phenomenon to understand the internal logic of its own traditionality.**

Accordingly, our teacher made a comparison between the two readings—**axiomatic internal** and **mediated external**—and he saw that the former, according to its magnetic geometric logic, tends to highlight the consistency and unity of the cognitive phenomenon and thought. As for the other reading, if it does not scatter the cognitive phenomenon according to the influence of historical evolution and environmental changes, it works to particularize it with the generative circumstance, making the unity of the external medium the cause of the cognitive phenomenon and its coherence.

Fifth: The Systems and Cognition of Islamic Heritage

First: Systems and Their Cognitive Mechanisms

According to the thinker Yahya Muhammad, it can be said that Islamic heritage **embraces two cognitive systems**, which we have called the **existential system** and the **normative system**, each with competing cognitive circles. The first carries two circles: philosophical and gnostic, while the second carries two: rational and textual (transmitted). Thus, Islamic thought—as heritage—contains four different circles that are methodologically differentiated by their cognitive tools, although their cognitive production and understanding of religious texts are determined according to the effective generative principles they carry, which function as a **dynamo for thinking and theorization**. Methodological tools cannot produce understanding and knowledge without these bonds. Through these two systems, one can determine the dimensions and affiliations included in each system, which embody Islamic thought and

heritage in its cognitive dimensions and various contexts and epistemological structures that define Islamic heritage.

A. The Normative System

In analyzing and classifying these cognitive systems and the sciences they include, Yahya Muhammad states in his book *The Science of Method* that these two systems—he says—"we have called one the **normative system** and the other the **existential system**. The first system includes the sciences of kalam, jurisprudence, exegesis, hadith, and related sciences, distinguished by their adoption of **prescriptive conduct** as their central pivot. These are sciences whose main concern is researching values related to action and behavior, whether in the textual or rational circle." Thus, the features of thought in the normative system, which deals with kalam, jurisprudence, exegesis, and hadith, can be identified.

Yahya Muhammad further clarifies in his book *The Method in Understanding Islam: From Sectarian Thinking to Methodical Thinking* that the normative system is the system of reason and discourse. He explains that the first section deals with the rational understanding circle, including two chapters addressing two dominant methods of this circle, expressing two generative principles, which we previously called **self-right** and **property-right**. The second section deals with the textual understanding circle, including three chapters addressing two key issues of this circle: **clarity and detail**. The first chapter discusses general characteristics, treating "clarity" as a prominent feature, while the other two chapters address "detail," based on the references of prophetic hadith and ijthihad.

The rational method has its generative principles, as extensively mentioned in the book *Normative Systems*, where Yahya Muhammad details many issues related to the normative system, the rational method, and the principles it relies upon. For instance, the meaning of **self-right**, according to Yahya Muhammad, is that an act in itself, or in its attributes and conditions, generates permission and acceptance without any external constraint. Conversely, **property-right** means that the act does not generate permission and acceptance by itself or by its conditions but according to an external constraint called "real ownership." Thus, the first definition derives the right from the act itself or its attributes and conditions, while the second derives it from the external constraint of ownership. He further elaborates: the self-right implies that the act itself, or its attributes and conditions, fulfill the purpose and interest, unlike the conditional right of ownership, where the act itself does not generate purpose and interest.

Although the normative system carries deep cognitive significance at the conceptual level and in attributing meaning to terms, it is impossible to understand the premises of either the normative or existential system without addressing the terminology accompanying the idea and its epistemological dimension. Yahya Muhammad states: "Although both directions are justified by the rational method, the obligations and prescriptive duties in the first are not the same as in the other. The first bases its positions on rational duties, meaning that self-right entails self-duty, which can only be apprehended by reason. The latter is therefore the basis of prescriptive duties."

Conversely, regarding **property-right**, restricting the right by ownership, although beginning with a rational act, requires referring to another party outside reason to reveal the will of the absolute owner to determine the duties as imposed by the right. Consequently, prescriptive

duties, according to this logic, are non-rational, although their justification is derived from rational evidence.

The concept of self-right, as defined, involves the existence of rights and duties between the two parties of the prescriptive relationship. Rights on one side are duties on the other, and vice versa. In other words, every divine duty implies a human right, and every human duty implies a divine right. If the right exists fully in one party, the duty is fully established in the other. Yahya Muhammad then asks a fundamental question: **How are rational duties founded according to the logic of self-right?** The answer follows mechanisms and conditions: the formulation of the theory of prescription is within rational conditions; some apply to the one obligated, others to the obligated upon. Logically, the conditions of the obligated must precede those of the obligated upon; the latter are existentially dependent on the former—without the first, the second cannot exist.

The first rational condition required of the obligated is **justice**. Without this value, the prescriptive relationship cannot be correct. Justice is the foundation of all other rational duties, from which arise numerous legal rules—information, empowerment, capability, reward, punishment, etc.—within the limits of self-right. Thus, prescriptive relationships are only correct under divine justice. This principle influenced all kalam schools, notably the Mu'tazila, who used the highest analogy to deduce their rulings and positions. They compared divine action with human action, emphasizing wisdom and other principles based on shared causality between the visible and unseen.

The Mu'tazila emphasize four evidences in doctrine: reason (primary), scripture, hadith, and consensus. Knowledge of God is attained only through reason; scripture must be verified through reason, establishing divine truthfulness. Qadi Abd al-Jabbar states: "Knowledge of God is attained only through reason, as all else depends on knowing God through His unity and justice; anything derived otherwise is a branch depending on the origin, which is impermissible."

Justice, thus, is a foundational principle, inseparable from monotheism in its essence, though the relationship between them is **normatively binding** rather than constitutive. The normative obligation arises from values, as the guarantee of justice comes from monotheism, given divine self-sufficiency despite absolute power and will.

B. The Existential System

The other system—the **existential system**—includes the sciences of philosophy and gnosis, addressing the problem of existence as its main subject, imparting determinism across all levels and aspects. It applies its existential determinism even to normative issues, including the theory of prescription, in both gnostic (aesthetic) and philosophical (rational) circles.

The concept of **existence** began as a term philosophers used to describe the principle of first existence (God). Though initially metaphorical, later thinkers treated it as actual reality, aiming to resolve philosophical dilemmas between existence and essence. For instance, Suhrawardi viewed the realities of things as essences, making existence purely mental, except for the first principle of existence, to avoid arising problems if considered an essence.

Later existentialists examined the relationship between existence and essence, both for the first absolute existence (necessary being) and its emanations. Their analysis sometimes led to

divergent results and required interpreting existence in multiple, often ambiguous ways. Scholars of kalam investigated the necessary being extensively, with philosophers like Sadr al-Muta'allehin affirming the actual and cosmic meaning of existence versus essence.

For mystics, existence conveys a single comprehensive meaning: **being, actuality, realization, and permanence**, which cannot be considered merely conceptual. Some view existence as what realizes the thing in the external world, and according to the gnostic Abdul-Razzaq Kashani, existence exists by itself, sustaining all else, self-sufficient while all else is dependent on it.

In the existential system, philosophical understanding of religious texts relies on a generative principle: **“analogy” (al-sunkhiya)**. This principle functions dually as method and generative vision, with its outputs depending on both intellectual reasoning and perception of existence in terms of causes and effects. All existence is seen as intellect of varying perfection, and all intellect as existence.

Yahya Muhammad considers **Al-Farabi** the first conservative Muslim philosopher preserving the traditional philosophical method. Although Al-Kindi preceded him by about half a century, he is not considered conservative, as his belief in the created world separated from the first principle of existence disrupted the principle of analogy and determinism, central to traditional philosophy. Al-Farabi, by contrast, preserved the law of analogy.

Similarly, gnostic circles establish their vision based on analogy as a generative principle, using perception and spiritual witnessing rather than rational methods. Many existentialists combined both methods in a system later called the **Illuminationist method**.

In its epistemological dimensions, the gnostic circle carries the dimension of the self as the driver of taste and sentiment, since the knower is one who strives in his quest to reach the truth and draw closer to his Lord. Consequently, the states appear upon him due to his frequent acts of worship, and he ascends to reach this spiritual station. Therefore, Yahya Muhammad considers that gnosticism did not incorporate rational understanding as an epistemic tool. In Islamic thought, although gnostic heritage occasionally intermixed with philosophy, it remained faithful to the experiential dimension in all its foundations and aspects.

Through this, Yahya Muhammad shows that Islamic culture and civilization are characterized by two dimensions: reliance on the logic of reason on one hand, and the gnostic dimension on the other. It can be said that the realm of gnosis and Sufism dominated the broader cultural field, and on this basis, transmission within Islamic culture “was not merely intellectual insights and content, but rather a specific method of observation and thought determined primarily by the existential thinking dynamo represented in the law of (principle and similarity). If the process of transmission maintained this dynamo as its basis, then what is called Islamic philosophy and theoretical Islamic gnosis both express a ‘differentiated intellect’ of the general intellect previously approached by Greek culture and other ancient cultures.”

From this perspective, the thinker Yahya Muhammad establishes the idea that the space of Islamic philosophy in its various domains—whether classical Islamic philosophy or gnosis—though locally influenced by the Arab environment, also contains elements from other incoming cultures. Accordingly, one can align with Ali Sami Al-Nashar’s view in *The Emergence of Islamic Thought in Islam*, where he states: “Our aim is to study Sufism and its development and place it within a particular philosophical framework with neutrality and objectivity. We find

before us a strange mixture, some of which represents Islam and follows the two primary principles—the Qur’an and the Sunnah—while others contradict or interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah in a gnostic manner. Here we ask: can Sufism be considered a separate, distinct unit from parts of Islamic philosophy? In other words, can we deny that what occurred in Islamic Sufism at the highest level of spiritual life in Islam is the same as what occurred in Islamic rational thought?”

Based on this, Yahya Muhammad affirms that philosophical thought in Arab culture cannot be reduced to the Greek environment. However, if we examine Islamic philosophical heritage from the perspective of the originating principle or in light of the thinking dynamo, we cannot separate it from its founding source. He notes: “Although many issues confronted Islamic philosophy for the first time, which cannot easily be traced to Greek, Roman, or other philosophies, defining them methodologically in light of the thinking dynamo or the effective originating principle makes the philosophical system within Islamic culture an expression of the differentiated intellect of the founding source.”

This idea applies to many topics in Islamic philosophy. Yahya Muhammad explains: “This applies to numerous matters, such as issues related to existence and essence, cause and effect, philosophical and gnostic interpretations of prophecy and religious texts, details of paradise and hell, and the foundation of the virtuous city. As Al-Tabatabai mentioned, the number of issues translated from Greek to Arabic was no more than two hundred, whereas among Muslims, it reached nearly seven hundred. Yet all of this expresses a differentiated intellect of the Greek intellect and other earlier civilizations.”

Yahya Muhammad clarifies that the emergence of gnosis and Sufism in Islamic heritage did not aim to negate philosophy but rather to elevate and integrate it. The philosopher is not devoid of Sufi or experiential dimensions, nor is the gnostic devoid of philosophy; both complement each other in the pursuit of knowledge. This approach was exemplified by Suhrawardi. Yahya Muhammad notes: “Gnosis did not come to invalidate philosophy or abandon it but to correct its course and complete its vision. In Islamic culture, differentiation between gnosis and philosophy was not antagonistic. Generally, the philosopher is not without gnosis, and the gnostic is not without philosophy. This reconciliatory approach prevailed among existentialists in Islamic civilization, eventually forming the so-called Illuminationist line, which integrated philosophy and gnosis; neither can exist without the other, as with Suhrawardi and his followers to this day.”

According to Yahya Muhammad, the primary reason for this integration of philosophy and gnosis lies in the originating principle, the law of similarity and typology, and the derived and inspired thinking from previous civilizations—particularly Greek. He states: “Perhaps the main reason most existentialists in Islamic civilization joined the Illuminationist line is that they adopt a single originating principle upon which the epistemic production and formation of existential visions are based.”

Accordingly, the philosopher’s and the gnostic’s thinking can be treated as a unified entity. “This unity enables the philosopher or gnostic to assume the role of the other simultaneously; it is natural that every philosopher is a gnostic and every gnostic a philosopher. Both address the same subject—general existence—often employing two tools: intellect and heart.”

Thus, the thinking and reasoning dynamo “has a shared nature represented in the law of similarity and typology, explaining the similarity in vision established by existentialists, whether philosophers or gnostics, as well as the capacity for theorizing by combining both methods.”

In the normative system, “its rational circle carries more than one generating epistemic apparatus. Each apparatus functions according to certain rational principles, forming a generating method and vision upon which epistemic production and understanding of the religious text are based. This circle operates according to two main originating principles, united by a general link: ‘right,’ though differing in interpretation as self-right or right conditional on ownership. Kalam shows that this existential system, as evidenced by rational kalam, considers the first (right) a normative entity not conditioned by external conditions, as embraced by the Mu‘tazila, Imami, Zaydi, and similar groups, as a basis for preconception and organized epistemic production, followed by text comprehension. Others, like the Ash‘aris, view this ‘right’ as conditional on ownership, forming the basis allowing the absolute owner to dispose of his property freely.”

Yahya Muhammad notes that the textual circle “remains within the normative system, based on customary understanding of the text. The text, with its epistemic considerations, is the primary reference for knowledge formation. Other sources have no validity unless aligned with the text’s authority. For the textualist, sources of knowledge and legislation begin with the text: the Qur’an, followed by the Prophetic Sunnah, then consensus as an expositor of the text, possibly supplemented by the sayings and conduct of the Companions, and subsequently other principles of ijtiḥad, usually derived directly or indirectly from the text.”

Conclusion:

Islamic heritage, according to Yahya Muhammad, encompasses two epistemic systems: the existential system, encompassing philosophy and gnosis, and the normative system, which contains rational and textual circles, studying sciences of kalam, jurisprudence, exegesis, and ḥadith. The normative system refers to two generating principles: self-right and ownership-right. Self-right means the act, in itself or in its qualities and conditions, is sufficient for permission and acceptance without external constraint. Ownership-right means the act does not generate permission and acceptance by itself but depends on external constraints. The normative system carries deep epistemic significance, both conceptually and in assigning meaning to words and terms, as understanding the system’s foundations—normative or existential—requires engagement with the terminology and its epistemological dimension.

The concept of self-right entails rights and duties between parties in a contractual relationship: rights of one party are the duties of the other, and vice versa. Thus, every divine duty is simultaneously a human right, and every human duty is inherently a divine right; if the full right exists in one party, the corresponding duty exists in the other.

The rational conditions and duties required in the subject’s domain include justice. Justice is foundational and indispensable, like the principle of monotheism; their relationship, although characterized by necessity, is normative rather than inherent.

The existential system encompasses philosophy and gnosis, contemplating the general problem of existence with a deterministic approach at all levels. For theologians and gnostics, existence carries a single conceptual meaning: existence, realization, and individuation are identical. Some gnostics view existence as what actualizes a thing externally. In the existential system, philosophical vision and understanding of the religious text are founded on a generating principle—the principle of typology—serving as both method and generating vision. Similarly, the gnostic circle bases its vision on typology, employing intuitive and heart-based perception. Although many existentialists combined both tools, the late scholars termed this approach the Illuminationist method.

The Arab-Islamic intellect derives its primary essence from the sacred text, using it to shape scientific culture and production. Yahya Muhammad distinguishes between two readings of heritage: the external reading and the internal reading. He critiques Arab and Islamic elites for adopting the external reading, exposing its contradictions: it fails to reveal the continuity and unity of heritage despite differing external factors. He offers a critical, epistemological examination of al-Jabri's formation of the Arab mind.

Yahya Muhammad critiques the external reading practiced by al-Jabri. His interest lies in analyzing al-Jabri's project, representing modern studies reflecting the external approach. Al-Jabri bases the unity of Arab-Islamic intellect on geographic and historical continuity, attributing structural stability to environmental factors and political processes. Yahya Muhammad asserts that the internal reading penetrates the essence of the epistemic phenomenon rather than its exterior, assuming the phenomenon as a logical template with an axiomatic geometric system dictated by the logic of originating principles—the “thinking dynamo.” Unlike external reading, which assigns the medium's culture as the source of emergence, internal reading investigates the internal logic of the phenomenon.

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