Between Flesh and Thought: Philosophical Perspectives on Corporeal Consciousness

Abstract

The traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body has long dominated Western approaches to consciousness, presenting thinking as detached from physical existence. However, contemporary philosophical inquiry increasingly situates consciousness not as an ethereal attribute of thought alone, but as fundamentally embodied in the fleshly existence of living beings. This review synthesizes key philosophical perspectives on corporeal consciousness—the idea that bodily experience is intrinsic to conscious thought and subjectivity. Drawing from phenomenology (particularly Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh), somaesthetics, embodied cognition, and continental critiques of dualism, we explore how the body serves as both mediator and locus of conscious experience. After outlining historical debates and the mind–body problem, we examine phenomenological accounts that reject dualism, analytic work on embodied cognitive processes, and interdisciplinary engagements such as enactivism and somaesthetic philosophy. The review assesses how these frameworks collectively challenge traditional separations between flesh and thought, proposing instead that consciousness is lived through the body rather than merely housed in the brain or abstract mind. This integrated account has implications for understanding perception, agency, identity, and the lived self. The paper concludes with suggestions for future research at the intersection of philosophy, neuroscience, and cognitive science.